"Approval Voting" lacks a sound moral base for the individual voter's choice of approval versus non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected by Thomas Colignatus
“Approval Voting” lacks a sound moral base for the
individual voter’s choice of approval versus non-





“Approval Voting” is the voting mechanism reportedly used since 1987 by
professional and scientific societies such as the Econometric Society, INFORMS,
ASA, AMS, MAA, IEEE and the Social Choice and Welfare Society. The method
lacks a sound moral base for the choice by individual members between approval
and non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected. Minority rights are
better protected when every voter respects the uniform Status Quo, rather than
allowing that every voter determines a private (secret) reference point. A better
method than Approval Voting is the (Pareto-)  Borda Fixed Point rule introduced in
the literature in 2001.2
Introduction
“Approval Voting” (AV) allows voters to enter only 1's (approved) and 0's (non-
approved) weights. For example, on the ballot you cross out all names for the items
that you want to reject, and then only the remaining items are counted. A zero value
merely counts as a weight, it does not mean that the individual has veto rights. As a
rule, the item with the highest score is selected.
Brams & Fishburn (2003) clarify:
“Beginning in 1987, several scientific and engineering societies adopted AV,
including the Mathematical Association of America (MAA), with about
32,000 members; American Mathematical Society (AMS), with about
30,000 members; Institute for Operations Research and Management
Sciences (INFORMS), with about 12,000 members; American Statistical
Association (ASA), with about 15,000 members; Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), with about 377,000 members. Smaller
societies that use AV include the Society for Judgment and Decision
Making, the Social Choice and Welfare Society, the International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, and the European Association for
Logic, Language and Information. Additionally, the Econometric Society
has used AV (with certain emendations) to elect fellows since 1980 (Gordon,
1981); likewise, since 1981 the selection of members of the National
Academy of Sciences (1981) at the final stage of balloting has been based on
AV.  Coupled with many colleges and universities that now use AV—from
the departmental level to the school-wide level—it is no exaggeration to say
that several hundred thousand individuals have had direct experience with
AV. Probably the best-known official elected by AV today is the secretary-
general of the United Nations (Brams and Fishburn, 1983).”
Professor Steven Brams is perhaps the best known theorist on AV. My discussion
here benefits much from his earlier comments and literature references, and I want to
express my gratitude. It may be noted that my own analysis hasn’t gained his
approval yet but I will be honoured if it does.
My analysis on voting in general is given in Colignatus (2001 & 2005). AV in
particular is discussed only in Colignatus (2001). My conclusion there is:
 The normal state in the world is “strategic voting” (cheating) and then AV
collapses to “Plurality Voting” (PV), where people basically vote for their first
candidate. Voting for another item does not favour your first choice, especially
when that first choice has the probability of getting most votes. (Note that the
normal situation is that one item has most votes.)
 The Status Quo (SQ) provides a natural base (for a honest vote) to separate
approval from non-approval. Voters reject what is worse (for them) w.r.t. the SQ
and they approve of what is at least as good (for them) w.r.t. the SQ. Note that
rejection here assigns individual veto power, and thus protects minority rights.3
For example, when the majority decides that they want your house, you have a
right to veto that. Note that the SQ might be taken as an incumbant or a vacancy,
or whatever depending upon the constitution. Setting the status quo as the norm,
causes the SQ itself to have the widest approval base; the status quo is only
challenged when it is Pareto inoptimal (i.e. when there is another point that is as
good); but then there is no clear mechanism to break the tie.
 A morally attractive voting mechanism is where one first selects the points that
are Pareto optimizing (PO) w.r.t. the SQ, and then one applies the Borda Fixed
Point method to those points to break that tie (the BordaFP method was
introduced in Colignatus (2001)).
My conclusion and suggestion for others is that AV lacks a sound moral base for the
choice of approval versus non-approval, especially when the status quo is neglected.
As a tie-breaking rule for the PO items w.r.t. the SQ, the morally attractive method is
BordaFP. In the Economics Pack, see Colignatus (1999, 2005), the Pareto-BordaFP
method is called “majority voting” since it closely captures what people understand
by that term (for a majority that repects the minority). The implication is that AV
falls out. It will be useful to express this more fully below.
The users of AV are advised to reconsider their philosophy. It is admirable that they
were willing to experiment with AV since 1987. Nowadays they could take
advantage of the progress in our knowledge since 2001. Of course it depends upon
individual choice what voting mechanism one prefers, but social preference could
converge on BordaFP, above AV, once the mechanisms are understood.
The argument more fully
Note that the Status Quo (SQ) gives the present situation. An economic definition is
that someone will approve of everything that improves over the present situation and
will disapprove of everything that means a deterioration.
My impression, as I currently read the situation, is that users of AV might very well
confuse the sensation of approval/non-approval with this SQ-issue.
One
An example works wonders. Consider three items A, B  and C.  If these are better
than the SQ and voters are honest about that then all are approved. Approval voting
thus doesn’t give a rule to break that tie. Let us then neglect the Status Quo and for
example assume that all items on ballot are better than a vacancy.
Assume that 1/3 of the electorate prefers A  and might vote for B  as a compromise,
so that their preference order is {3, 2, 1}, with a higher value for “more preferred” as
in a normal utility function. Under AV they have the choice between {1, 0, 0} and
{1, 1, 0} since they “do not approve” of C.  Assume that 2/3 of the electorate prefers
C and might vote for B as a compromise, thus preference {1, 2, 3} and the choice
between {0, 0, 1} and {0, 1, 1} since they “do not approve” of A. These assumptions4
are tabulated in Table 1 which also shows that the information on approval versus
non-approval is additional to the standard information on preferences.
Table 1: Example voting field on items A, B  and C  other than SQ
1/3 of the electorate 2/3 of the electorate
Ordinal preference {3, 2, 1} {1, 2, 3}
Additional information on
approval / non-approval
No approval for C,
true AV gives {1, 1, 0}
No approval for A,
true AV gives {0, 1, 1}
Strategic vote (cheating) {1, 0, 0} {0, 0, 1}
Under honesty (and assuming that there is an independent moral base for approval
versus non-approval), B  would be chosen under AV while C  is the more logical
choice under Plurality, Borda and BordaFP. Some might argue that this precisely
shows that AV is the best method, in particular since professional and scientific
organisations can expect their members to vote honestly. However, it makes more
sense to adopt a method (i) that relies on preference and doesn’t assume an
independent moral base for approval versus non-approval, (ii) that generates the true
majority view and (iii) that is realistic with respect to strategic voting (i.e. use
BordaFP).
Indeed, if the electoral situation is tense and if the society is in need of a compromise
candidate, then it is useful to foster that compromise by the better method that the
candidates express their views on the issues at hand, work towards a compromise
and win over the voters to accept their compromise. To rely on technique or
assumptions on a moral base for approval versus non-approval is dubious. AV
doesn’t necessarily contribute to a compromise since it still is sensitive to strategic
voting. AV already assumes and relies on a compromise-prone atmosphere, that
however can also be appealed to by the open discussion of the views of the
candidates and their attitude towards compromise.
If the house is highly divided, and one seriously wants to use technique to resolve
this (whatever its dubious value), then the AV may conceal the true progress towards
reconciliation. A better technique might be that more than 50% of the house first
decides to vote only on compromise candidates. Who these are can be determined by
100% of the vote (perhaps lower if none is found). If there is only one candidate, he
or she can be considered elected, otherwise BordaFP would be most sensible to
break the tie on the compromise candidates. This actually is the earlier procedure on
the SQ, but now applied to the notion of compromise. Actually, the only convincing
reason why the house can be so divided (i.e. having a minority not accepting the
majority view), while 50% of the house might accept that a “compromise” is needed
for, derives from a violation of the rights of the minority on what they perceive as
the SQ.5
Two
The status quo provides the only natural base for approval versus non-approval. If
voter i has A  < SQ then this voter is justified to express non-approval of A. This is so
important, with James Madison, that one should not just allow a simple 0 value but
even give minorities veto rights.
In the example above, the situation for 1/3 of the electorate might in truth be A > B >
SQ > C   while the situation for 2/3 of the electorate might in truth be C > B > SQ >
A.  It that case, “majority voting” defined as Pareto-BordaFP generates B  as the
solution, since A and C  are vetoed each by one part of the electorate while B  is for
all an improvement over the SQ.
Individual veto power can be abused but a separate chamber (e.g. the Senate in a bi-
cameral parliament) or the courts could check that abuse.
For users of AV it would be useful to delve into the question why people would
consider something worthy of approval and something else worthy of non-approval.
That is, if they think that it is something else than the SQ-issue. My question for
those users is that they specify what other emotional base approval/non-approval
would have, other than Madisonian protection of minority rights.
NB. 1) Note that approval/non-approval as an emotional primitive may be awkward,
since this would cut off communication. People may be goaded into approving or
non-approving something for reasons that go against human rights. If approval/non-
approval is accepted as an emotional primitive then one does not have an argument
to reject such preferences. If one accepts approval/non-approval as primitive, then
one loses utility theory, and then one would be forced to accept AV.
NB. 2) Another possibility is that members of professional and scientific societies
often are indifferent about candidates on ballot. Often it is easiest not to vote at all,
so that one leaves the decision to more opinionated and supposedly more informed
persons. The state of indifference should however not be confused with the issue at
hand. One can be indifferent amongst the approved and indifferent amongst the non-
approved, but that still leaves the question how one defends that original distinction.
NB. 3) Finally, note the parallel between utility theory and deontic logic in Table 2.
Table 2: Parallel between utility theory and deontic logic
Simple preference Deontic logic (logic of morals)
Better Ought (part of Allowed)
Indifferent Freedom (part of Allowed)
Worse Not Allowed
I refer to Colignatus (2001) chapter 3.5 for a discussion of this. Obviously, the vote
on candidates for committee in a professional or scientific society cannot be seen as6
a moral choice, though it may be confused with it. The logic of morals thus does not
provide a philosophical base for AV.
For both columns, the issue on the SQ is the same as already discussed.
NB 4) I can repeat the observation that users of AV may very well be confused on
this SQ-issue. On the other hand, in their confusion, it may well be that they
stumbled upon a neat method. In a low resource setting, the addition of 1’s may be
easier than the addition of Borda counts. In the example of 1/3 A > B > SQ > C   and
2/3 C > B > SQ > A,  the AV method generates the same solution as the more
complex approach of first selecting the Pareto points and then applying the BordaFP
method. The answer is that theorists should be clear on the principles involved and
that for practical application the proof is in the eating of the pudding.
Three
Brams & Fishburn (2003) state: “Our rhetoric has remained relatively constant over the
years and can be summarized by the following six propositions”. My comments on these
propositions are as follows.
“1.  AV gives voters more flexible options.  They can do everything they can
under PV [Plurality Voting]—vote for a single favorite—but if they have no
strong preference for one candidate, they can express this fact by voting for
all candidates they find acceptable.  In addition, if a voter’s most-preferred
candidate has little chance of winning, then that voter can vote for both a
first choice and a more viable candidate without worrying about wasting his
or her vote on the less popular candidate.”
This is also achieved in BordaFP. The distinction between the best and second best
of course means that the latter has a lower weight. Preference comes at a price. It is
better that voters be not indifferent, since, when two items end up equal, a choice
must be made nevertheless. It is best to put the question of choice to each individual
voter.
“2.  AV helps elect the strongest candidate.  Under PV, the candidate
supported by the largest minority often wins, or at least makes the runoff if
there is one.  Under AV, by contrast, the candidate with the greatest overall
support will generally win.  In particular, Condorcet candidates, who can
defeat every other candidate in separate pairwise contests, almost always win
under AV, whereas under PV they often lose because they split the vote with
one or more other centrist candidates.”
This is rhetorics. Who is “strongest” depends upon, and is defined by, the voting
mechanism. The point is that BordaFP has properties that many will tend to prefer
(looking at what people use and say what they intend).
“3.  AV will reduce negative campaigning.  AV induces candidates to try to
mirror the views of a majority of voters, not just cater to minorities whose
votes could give them a slight edge in a crowded plurality contest.  AV is
therefore likely to cut down on negative campaigning, because candidates
will have an incentive to broaden their appeals by reaching out for approval
to voters who might have a different first choice.  Lambasting such a choice,7
rather than being more expansive, risks alienating this candidate’s
supporters, thereby losing their approval.”
It depends. In the example above, candidate B  indeed has an incentive to suck up to
the two groups that actually prefer A  or C.  This behaviour might provoke C  to state
to be the “real thing”, so that AV reduces to PV. This argument thus is misguided. It
may have rhetorical value for professional and scientific societies that have little
“negative campaigning” and that enjoy to hear that they use methods that discourage
that. It is better to have an election mechanism that has attractive properties and
subsequently provide a climate that recognises lambasting when it occurs.
PM. Brams & Fishburn (2003) state “psychologically there is almost surely a
difference between approving and disapproving of candidates”. For this reason I use the
opposing pairs “approval versus non-approval”. The AV literature frequently opposes
“approval versus disapproval” but for disapproval one might consider a value –1.
“4.  AV will increase voter turnout.  By being better able to express their
preferences, voters are more likely to vote in the first place.  Voters who
think they might be wasting their votes, or who cannot decide which of
several candidates best represents their views, will not have to despair about
making a choice.   By not being forced to make a single—perhaps
arbitrary—choice, they will feel that the election system allows them to be
more honest, which will make voting more meaningful and encourage
greater participation in elections.”
Borda and BordaFP allow more expression of preference than AV. It can be
explained to voters that they must choose. If they cannot, then they might abstain or
use dice, but that is their responsibility.
A general conclusion forwarded by Colignatus (2001) is that representative
democracy works best for a whole nation. Voters select a single party of their choice.
Those parties are professionally equipped to apply the more complicated procedure
(BordaFP) to select the President (and other dignitaries).
“5.  AV will give minority candidates their proper due.  Minority candidates
will not suffer under AV:  their supporters will not be torn away simply
because there is another candidate who, though less appealing to them, is
generally considered a stronger contender.  Because AV allows these
supporters to vote for both candidates, they will not be tempted to desert the
one who is weak in the polls, as under PV.  Hence, minority candidates will
receive their true level of support under AV, even if they cannot win.  This
will make election returns a better reflection of the overall acceptability of
candidates, relatively undistorted by strategic voting, which is important
information often denied to voters today.”
Borda and BordaFP allow for this too, likely better than AV. For example, in the
Bush, Gore and Nader vote, the Naderites might vote {1, 2, 3} or {1, 3, 2},
depending upon how much they dislike Bush being chosen, or {2, 1, 3} or {3, 1, 2}
depending upon how much they dislike Gore being chosen. In all cases, it will be
recorded that they exist.8
“6.  AV is eminently practicable.  Unlike more complicated ranking systems,
which suffer from a variety of theoretical as well as practical defects, AV is
simple for voters to understand and use.  Although more votes must be
tallied under AV than under PV, AV can readily be implemented on existing
voting machines.  Because AV does not violate any state constitutions in the
United States (or, for that matter, the constitutions of most countries in the
world), it requires only an ordinary statute to enact.”
This is a practical point. It would seem that, once the best system has been chosen
(see again my suggestion of “majority voting”), one could work towards solving the
practical issues. Once it has been established that flying is serious option, let us put
the airplane into operation.
Note that, in the example given above, where B is not the SQ, that it is eminently
practical that 1/3 of the electorate takes the SQ in B  and tries to veto  C, while 2/3 of
the electorate takes the SQ in B  and tries to veto A.  Practicality is important, but the
moral price can sometimes be too high. Admittedly, it is not always obvious what is
the SQ. (It is important to allow individual liberty to express different opinion,
especially when the majority thinks that the SQ is that they own your house.) But
from economic theory we know that there is a unique SQ and it is useful to have
procedures such that the whole electorate respects that unique SQ.
Other points
Once one delves into the AV literature, it appears that one can make comments on
particular points at various turns. It is not efficient that I do this here. Above gives
the main argument. Then it becomes more efficient that users of AV update their
reading of the literature, in particular Colignatus (2001) and the section on social
choice in Colignatus (2005), after which they will be able to provide the amendments
themselves.
Conclusion
“Approval Voting” lacks a sound moral base for the individual choice of approval versus
non-approval, especially when the Status Quo is neglected
The users of AV are advised to reconsider their philosophy. It is admirable that they
were willing to experiment with AV since 1987. Nowadays they could take
advantage of the progress in our knowledge since 2001. Of course it depends upon
individual choice what voting mechanism one prefers, but social preference could
converge on BordaFP, above AV, once the mechanisms are understood.9
Literature
Note: Colignatus is the name of Thomas Cool in science. Some archives may not recognize
that name.
My website is at http://www.dataweb.nl/~cool while much on Approval Voting can be found
in the website of professor Steven Brams at
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/index.html
Note that Colignatus (2001 & 2005) have a non-printable PDF on the website.
Note that my conclusion is that economists must read Colignatus (2005) if they want to
understand economics while social choice theorists must read Colignatus (2001), and the
section on social choice in Colignatus (2005), if they want to understand social choice.
Note that Colignatus (2001) has been fully included in my software, Colignatus  (1999), “The
Economics Pack, Applications for  Mathematica”. This inclusion means that the text of the
book is also available in the software under the Help function. There is the subtle distinction
that the printed book still dates from 1999 while the software has been updated to 2005. The
history is that I wrote the voting routines already in 1999 and that, with DRGTPE completed
in 2000, I decided that I could write a separate volume on voting theory. The update of the
voting routines in 2005 only concerns the switch to  Mathematica 5.0 and the inclusion of
Donald Saari’s ingeneous triangle graphics.
Brams, S.J. and P.C. Fishburn (2003), “Going from Theory to Practice:  The Mixed Success
of Approval Voting”, Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, August 28 - August 31, 2003
Colignatus (1999), “The Economics Pack, Applications for  Mathematica”, Scheveningen,
JEL-99-0820, ISBN 90-804774-1-9 (update of the software to 2005)
Colignatus (2001), “Voting theory for democracy”, Thomas Cool Consultancy &
Econometrics, ISBN 90-804774-3-5
Colignatus (2000, 2005), “Definition & Reality in the General Theory of Political Economy”,
Second Edition, Dutch University Press (a.k.a. DRGTPE)